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THE ABANDONED SHIPWRECK ACT OF
1987 IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
INCENTIVES TO HIGH TECH PIRACY?
Russell G Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
An estimated fifty thousand shipwrecks lie in the territorial waters of
the United States.' Five to ten percent of these wrecks are believed to have
historical significance.2 An extraordinarily high percentage of these wreck
sites are located within state boundaries.3 The Abandoned Shipwreck Act4
of 1987 (hereinafter ASA) controls the search for and exploration of these
historic wrecks and sets the legal and practical parameters for contempo-
rary "treasure hunting" in the United States.5 Recent decisions6 interpret-
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1. H.R. REP. No. 514(1), 100th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(4 Stat.) 365-83.
2. See generally Eugene Lyon, The Trouble with Treasure, 149 NAT'LGEOG. 787 (1976)
(discussing historical significance of large numbers of shipwrecks in United States waters).
3. Anne G. Giesecke, Shipwrecks: The Past in the Present, 15 COAST. MGMT. 179, 181,
189 (1987).
4. 4 U.S.C. §§ 2101-06 (1988); See generally McLaughlin infra note 5, at 181 n.187
(listing bills competing to become ASA).
5. See generally Sabrina McLaughlin, Roots Relics and Recovery: What Went Wrong
With the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 19 COLUM. - VLA J.L. & ARTS 149 (1995)
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ing or relating to the ASA confirm the longstanding criticism 7 of the Act
that it is poorly designed to achieve one of its primary goals: to promote
archeologically and environmentally sensitive historic shipwreck explora-
tion.8 An examination of these cases suggests that current law regulating
historic shipwrecks not only discourages lawful search and recovery but
actually encourages covert, unauthorized and illegal salvage operations.9
Such decisions seem destined to lead to the emergence of a new breed of
technologically sophisticated "pirates." This article explores some of the
problems created by the ASA as judicially interpreted by presenting three
"models" of shipwreck exploration pursuant to the Act: The "Compliance"
Model,' 0 "Negotiation" Model and "Pirates" Model. 2 It addresses a basic
question facing modem treasure hunters-will successful shipwreck search,
discovery, exploration and recovery be fairly rewarded-and proposes
some modest revisions 3 of the ASA to help answer that question in the
affirmative.
I. THE ABANDONED SHIPWRECK ACT OF 1987
The Abandoned Shipwreck Act 4 of 1987 asserts federal governmental
sovereignty over historic abandoned shipwrecks located within state
(discussing legislative purpose and subsequent effects of ASA on search and exploration for
historic shipwrecks in state waters).
6. See, e.g., Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634
(4th Cir. 2000); Fairport International Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as
the Captain Lawrence, 177 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 1999); The People ex rel. Illinois Historic
Preservation Agency v. Zych, 687 N.E.2d 141 (l. App. Ct. 1997).
7. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 5 and accompanying text, at 151, 192-93
(criticizing ASA as ignoring fundamental lessons of admiralty law, undermining base of
national maritime law and creating ineffective administrative regime for shipwreck
management).
8. H.R. Rep. No. 514(11), supra note 1, at 8 (stating primary purpose of ASA to foster
exploration and effective management of archeologically and historically significant
shipwrecks).
9. See e.g., infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing authorities noting that
ASA gives incentive to covert and unlawful salvage operation by discouraging lawful
recovery efforts).
10. See infra notes 117-217 and accompanying text (detailing "Compliance" Model
of shipwreck exploration).
11. See infra notes 218-48 and accompanying text (discussing "Negotiation" Model
of shipwreck exploration).
12. See infra notes 249-92 and accompanying text (presenting "Pirates" Model
resulting from disincentives for lawful shipwreck exploration created by ASA).
13. See infra notes 299-312 and accompanying text (suggesting statutory reforms to
alleviate negative effects of ASA).
14. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1988).
The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987
borders' 5 or state territorial waters.' 6 United States title is claimed to any
wreck "(1) embedded in submerged lands of a state; (2) embedded in
coralline formations protected by a state on submerged lands of a state; or
(3) on submerged lands of a state and (the wreck) is included in or
determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register (of Historic
Places).' 7 Exempted from operation of the Act are shipwrecks located
outside the three geographic [or, in a few cases, nine nautical] mile limit of
state territorial 8 waters, on public lands of the United States or on Indian
tribal lands.'9 Also excluded are wrecks that are not "embedded" in state
lands nor eligible for inclusion in the National Register, 2' as well as all
sovereign ships of the United States regardless of location.2' After
asserting title to these wrecks, the Act automatically transfers title to "the
state in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck is located."22 States
are vested with full administrative and management authority for shipwreck
exploration and site control23 subject to non-binding guidelines promul-
gated by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service.
The authority of the states extends expressly to "abandoned shipwrecks,
which have been deserted and to which the owner has relinquished
ownership rights with no retention."'25
In a most controversial provision,' the ASA effectively removes
federal court jurisdiction over claims to shipwrecks covered by the Act by
specifically prohibiting the federal courts from applying the age-old
15. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (Supp. 2002).
16. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (Supp. 2002). Territorial waters extend out three geographical
miles (or nine nautical miles for Florida, Texas and Puerto Rico) from the coast of each state.
Id.
17. See 43 U.S.C.§ 2105(a) (2002).
18. It
19. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(d) (2002).
20. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (Supp. 2002).
21. See generally Sea Hunt Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 47
F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Va. 1999); aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Sea Hunt v. The
Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000); cert denied Sea
Hunt v. Kingdom of Spain, 531 U.S. 1144 and cert denied Virginia v. Kingdom of Spain,
531 U.S. 1144 (discussing exclusion of certain types of wrecks from coverage under ASA).
22. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(c) (2002).
23. Id. at § 2101(a).
24. Id. at § 2104; See also 55 Fed. Reg. 50,116 (1990).
25. ld. at § 2101(b).
26. See generally McLaughlin supra note 5, at 170-71 and accompanying text (noting
most controversial provision that removes federal admiralty jurisdiction over shipwrecks
covered by ASA).
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maritime law concepts of "salvage ' 27 and "finds"28 to ASA cases.29 This
means that, in essence, once it is determined that a shipwreck is covered by
the ASA, all rights and claims to it are dependent on state law, must be
asserted in state court, and will be evaluated without reference to the
traditional body of admiralty law that has been applied by the federal courts
since the enactment of the United States Constitution.'
This dramatic and unusual restructuring of maritime law is supported
by several specific Congressional goals. The overarching purpose of the
ASA is historic shipwreck and wreck site protection." This is to be
achieved by transferring title and legal control of wrecks to the individual
states.32 Congress concluded that states are closest to the problems of near-
shore shipwreck exploration, are best equipped to deal with them, and have
the greatest interests at stake.33 Additionally, Congress determined that
state title, regulation, management and, when required, litigation would
solve the "confusion"' over ownership of abandoned wrecks caused by
prior federal court application of admiralty law.35 This, in turn, would
reduce federal court litigation. 6 The ASA also seeks to fill gaps in federal
legal protection of shipwrecks arising under the Archaeological Resources
27. See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (explaining traditional maritime law
of salvage).
28. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (explaining law of finds in
admiralty law).
29. 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a) (2002).
30. See U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2 (extending judicial power of United States to all
cases arising under admiralty and maritime law); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2002).
31. H.R. REP. No. 514(11), supra note 1, at 8 (identifying "protection of our nation's
maritime heritage" as goal of ASA).
32. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101(a), 2104 (2002) (transferring title of shipwrecks covered by
ASA to the respective states); 55 Fed. Reg. 50,116 (1990).
33. See generally David R. Owen, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Good-Bye
to Salvage in the Territorial Sea, 19 J. MAR. L. & COM. 499, 500 (1988) (discussing
reasoning behind ASA).
34. Timothy T. Stevens, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Finding the Proper
Ballastfor the States, 37 VnLL. L. REv. 573, 579-88 (1992); McLaughlin supra note 5, at
174-98.
35. Owen, supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining purposes behind ASA
enactment).
36. See H.R. REP. No. 514supra note l, pt. 1I, at 2-3, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 370-72; see also, Anne G. Giesecke, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act Through the Eyes of
its Drafter, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 167, 168 (and accompanying notes 5 and 6); McLaughlin,
supra note 5, at 174 ("uneven" federal court decisions); Forrest Booth, Who Owns Sunken
Treasure? The Supreme Court, the Abandoned Shipwreck Act and the Brother Jonathan,
11 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 77, 85 (1998-1999) (Congress was "concerned that shipwreck and
salvage litigation was tying up the [federal] courts and [such litigation] was only likely to
increase.").
The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987
Protection, 37 Outer Continental Shelf Lands, 38 Submerged Lands, 39
Antiquities,' and National Marine Sanctuaries Acts.4
One final goal motivated enactment of the ASA: the elimination of
private salvage of historic wrecks.42 This statute is premised on the view
that historic shipwreck exploration and recovery should be carried out by
state governments using tax revenues rather than private salvors using
private risk capital.4 3 The investor-backed private salvor" was, and is,
regarded as a threat to wrecks and their surrounding marine environments.45
Marine archeologists,' historic preservationists, 47 state natural resources
officials," and various organizations49 are on record as condemning search
and recovery practices 5' of private salvors. The ASA effectively
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(aa)-(mm) (2002).
38. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (2002).
39. Id. at §§ 1301-15 (2002)
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (2002).
41. Id. at §§ 1431-39 (2002) (banning treasure hunting in 2800 sq. mile sanctuary
area).
42. See, e.g., Protection of Historic Shipwrecks: Hearing on S.1504 Before the
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Reserved Water of the Senate Comm. on Energy and
Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1983) (hereinafter Hearings on S.1504)
(testimony of Capt. Harry Allendorfer USN (ret.), Director of Maritime Preservation); See
also Abandoned Historic Shipwrecks: Hearings on H.R. 132 before the Subcommitte on
Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1982)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 132].
43. See e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 181 (original ASA bill premised on
"assumption that state-controlled salvage would protect the shipwrecks and preserve the
environment .... ").
44. See generally Edward W. Horan, Organizing, Manning, and Financing a Treasure
Salvage Expedition, 30 J. MAR. L & CoM. 235 (1999) (discussing financing of shipwreck
exploration and incentives to engage in salvage expeditions).
45. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting protection and preservation of
shipwrecks and surrounding environments as goals of ASA).
46. See Abandoned ShipwreckAct of 1987: Hearings on S.858 Before the Subcommit-
tee on Public Lands, National Parks and Forests of the Senate Comm. on Energy and
Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1987) (hereinafter Hearings on S.858)
(testimony of George Bass, Institute of Nautical Archeology).
47. See generally Hearings on H.R. 132, supra note 42, at 134-73 (extensive testimony
on negative consequences of private salvor techniques).
48. See e.g., Starr & Belleville, Florida: Diving for Dollars, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18,
1985, at 27 (quoting former head of Florida underwater archeology program that private
salvage would lead to "the destruction of all shipwrecks in state waters.").
49. See e.g., Paul F. Johnston, Treasure Salvage, Archeological Ethics and Maritime
Museums, 22 INT'L J. NAUT. ARCH. 53, 54 (1993) (describing policy statement of Council
of American Maritime Museums (CAMM) prohibiting its forty-eight member museums from
accepting artifacts discovered by commercial salvors).
50. See e.g., Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Technologies for
UnderwaterArcheology andMaritime Preservation-BackgroundPaper, OTA-BP-E-37, 30
tbl. 3 (1987) (summarizing various threats to marine artifacts posed by salvage techniques);
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disempowers these salvors by subjecting them to unlimited, nonuniform
and unreviewable state regulation,5 and by eliminating the system of
incentives and rewards provided by federal admiralty courts that justified
the salvor's work.12 The ASA does not, however, specify how the work
historically performed by the private salvor will be accomplished under the
Act. 3 A review of ASA-based state laws illustrates this problem.
A. The States' Response
Over thirty states' have enacted laws pursuant to the grant of
Stevens, supra note 34, at 577 (blasting, dredging, winching, and blow torching);
McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 181 (noting primary objection to "mailboxing"); see also,
BARRY CLIFFORD, THE PIRATE PRINCE (DISCOVERING THE PRICELESS TREASURES OF THE
SUNKEN SHIP WHYDAH), 90 (Simon & Shuster 1993) (describing mailboxes or propwash
diverters as "huge metal elbows that slip over the propellers of a twin screw boat .... [a]fter
anchoring you start the engine, and when the propellers are engaged the mailboxes force a
stream of water into the sand, blowing a pit about eight feet wide at the bottom and up to
fifteen feet deep.").
51. 43 U.S.C. § 2101(a-b), 2104 (2002) (transferring title of shipwrecks covered by
ASA to the respective states); 55 Fed. Reg. 50,116 (1990); McLaughlin, supra note 5, at
183-84 (noting that states are empowered to vest shipwreck management authority in wide
range of agencies).
52. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing disincentives for legal
wrecking and salvage activities).
53. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 187 (noting "lu]nder the Act, there is no
incentive for the states to survey for shipwreck locations, much less to excavate the
wrecks.").
54. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 34, at 611 n. 186 (listing state statutes); see also Anne
G. Giesecke, Shipwrecks: The Past in the Present, 15 COASTAL MGMT. 179, 184-88 (table
comparing provisions of state laws) and Giesecke supra note 36, at 168 ("all states have
evaluated their legal systems as they apply to underwater resources and where necessary
have modified their laws."); see also ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.010 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41-841 (1992); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-80-401 (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 267.021 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-80 (1992); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 6E1-2 (1985); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 133c.02-133cl (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-3-3-3 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
41:1601 (West 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.27, § 371 (West 1964); MD. CODE ANN.,
Nat. Res. § 2-309 (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.6, § 180 (West 1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 138.51 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. §3 9-7-3 (Supp. 1989);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 253.420 (Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-3-421 (1991);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 227-C:1 (1989 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. BLDGS. LAW §60
(McKinney Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-22 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-01
to 55-10-02 (1983 & Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 54-7-610 (Law. Co-op 1992); TEX.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 191.091 (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 701 (1987 &
Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2214 (Michie 1989); WASH. REv. CODE RCW. §
27.53.045 (West Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 44.30 (West Supp. 1991). Guam the
Northern Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico had enacted historic shipwreck protection
legislation as well. See GUAM GOV'T CODE §13985.29-35 (Supp. 1974); N.M.I.
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management responsibility provided in the ASA and guidelines55 issued by
the Department of the Interior. These shipwreck management programs
differ from state to state on such crucial matters as: areas of state jurisdic-
tion;56 definition of resources regulated;5 7 nature of claim(s) made by the
state to protected resources;5 permit requirements59 for private search and
recovery; rewards and incentives;' penalties for unauthorized salvage;6
and agencies charged with enforcement.62 The ASA has spawned extensive
state bureaucracies charged with administering state laws and regulations
that are often confusing and contradictory. Today, a law-abiding salvor
committed to historic shipwreck exploration must make an informed guess
at which state's law will apply (based on location of the wreck),63 obtain
authority from the state to search or recover, and rely on state law for
compensation. As later sections of this article indicate," even with state
COMMONwEALTHCODE tit. 2, § 4811 (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 18 §§1501-1508 (1989).
55. 43 U.S.C. § 2104 (2002); 55 Fed. Reg. 50,116 (1990).
56. See, e.g., N.Y. (underwater sites), § 14 (Consol. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. §
22.3.421-442 (2001) (upon or beneath the earth or underwater). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267
(West 1999) (state-owned lands or submerged lands); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121.22-28 (2001)
(bottoms of navigable waters, one marine league into the Atlantic).
57. Cf., e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. R.S. § 41.1601 (Supp. 2001) (sunken or abandoned pre
20" century ships and wrecks of the sea); MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 6 § 180 (2002) (sunken ships
unclaimed for 100 years or valued at $5,000 or more); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.021(3) (2001)
(sunken or abandoned ships).
58. Cf., e.g., N.Y. LAws § 14 (Consol. 2001) (regulatory authority); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 121.22 (2001) (title); but see Giesecke Shipwrecks supra note 54 (vast majority of states
assert title).
59. Cf., e.g.,OfOREV.CODEANN. § 1506.10 (West 2001) (no private salvage permits)
and 90-093 Op. Att'y Gen. note 3 (opinion of the Ohio Attorney General); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 267 (West 1999) (contract); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. R.S. § 41.1601 (2001) (contract for
scientific or educational exploration); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121.22 (2001) (license). MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 6 § 180 (2001) (permit, state option to purchase).
60. Cf., e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 6 § 180(2001) (75% of the value of artifacts
recovered); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267 (West 1999) (compensation by contract); LA STAT. ANN.
R.S. § 41.1601 (2001) (quantum meruit); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121.22 (2001) (monetary fee
or portion agreement).
61. Cf., e.g., N.Y. LAws § 14 (Consol. 2001) (misdemeanor atjudges discretion); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 121.22 (2001) (fine or imprisonment of less than two years); S.C.CODE LAWS
ANN. § 54.7.400 (2001) (fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment for two years); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 267 (West 1999) (forfeit of artifacts plus fine not to exceed $500 or
imprisonment of two years).
62. Cf., e.g., CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 6002,63136 (1995) (State Lands Commission);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-23 (1944) (Department of Cultural Resources); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 41:1605 (West 1990) (Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 191.01 (2001) (Department of State).
63. See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a); 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (defining extent of territorial waters).
64. See, e.g., infra notes 189-217 and accompanying text (detailing litigation resulting
from twenty-six year effort to recover wreck in state waters).
174 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:167
permission and rewards, litigation subsequent to discovery may delay or
deny the salvor's claims. This uncertainty is a major threat to the goals of
the ASA.6'
B. Salvors and the Law of "Salvage" and "Finds " in the ASA System
For hundreds of years prior to enactment of the ASA, the private salvor
was the central figure in shipwreck location and exploration.' A rich body
of literature chronicles the exploits and escapades of these treasure
hunters.67 One of them, Key West's Mel Fisher," began using advanced
scientific technologies69 in the 1960's to search for and salvage historic
wrecks such as the Atocha70 and the 1715 Spanish Plate fleet." Federal
admiralty court enforcement of the salvage rights of adventurers like Fisher
65. See, e.g., McLaughlin supra note 5, at 192-93 (McLaughlin states "there is no
cohesive, nationwide harmony in the [state] management of shipwrecks .... Under the
current system, a salvor must consult a discouraging host of state laws, administrative codes,
and uninformed agencies before salvage work can begin ... ") Id. at 192-93. ("[Tlhe lucky
salvor... [will gain] the reward at the end of the labyrinth .... )" Id. at 197.
66. See JOHN VIELE, THE FLORIDA KEYS VOLUME 3, THE WRECKERS, 43-57 (Pineapple
Press, Inc. 2001). In May 1928 Congress "established the Superior Court for the Southern
Judicial District of the Territory of Florida," the original wreckers' court of Key West. Id.
at 57. In 1847, two years after Florida became a state, it was replaced by the District Court
of the United States for the Southern District of Florida. Id The court was to be open at all
times for admiralty cases. Id. "The Key West court was the only court in the United States
authorized to license (private) wrecking captains and wrecking vessels and to revoke licenses
for misconduct." Id.
67. See generally GARY KINDER, SHIP OF GoD IN THE DEEP BLUE SEA: THE HISTORY
AND DISCOVERY OFAMERICA'S RIcHEsT SHIPWRECK (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1998); BARRY
CLIFFORD wrrH PETER TURCm, THE PIRATE PRINCE: DISCOVERING THE PRICELESS
TREASURES OF THE SUNKEN SHIP WHYDAH (Simon & Schuster, 1993); EUGENE LYON,
SEARCH FOR THE MOTHER LODE (Florida Classics Library, 1989); ROBERT BURGESS,
SUNKEN TREASURE: Six WHO FOUND FORTUNES (Florida Classics Library, 2000); ROBERT
F. MARX, SHnwRECKS N THE AMERICAs (Bonanza Books, 1983).
68. EUGENE LYON, SEARCH FOR THE MOTHER LODE (Florida Classics Library, 1989)
(describing Fisher's use of advanced science to aid in exploration).
69. See, e.g., Stevens supra note 34, at 174-98 (summarizing technological
developments making shipwrecks accessible); See also Mather, Technology and the Search
for Shipwrecks, 302 MAR. L. & COM. 175 (1999).
70. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.
Fla. 1976), aff'd, 569 F. Supp. 2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidenti-
fied, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 459 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978), affd sub
nor., State of Florida, Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir.
1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 458 U.S. 670 (1982); revisited, 689 F. 2d 1254 (5th
Cir. 1982) (describing historical background of litigation over the Spanish vessels Nuestra
Senora de Atocha and Santa Margarita).
71. See Cobb Coin, Company, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987
led directly to the passage of the ASA and the imposition of extensive state
restrictions on this type of salvage.'
Modem salvage of historic shipwrecks is difficult (compared to
"find[ing] an exceedingly small needle in a dauntingly large haystack"), 73
expensive, 74 time-consuming,' heavily regulated,76 dangerous" and, in
financial terms, potentially highly rewarding.78 Until enactment of the
ASA, the salvor's primary, if not exclusive, incentive in undertaking the
risky, uncertain and expensive task of salvage was the availability of a
federal admiralty court grant of either a liberal salvage award79 or an
outright grant of title to an abandoned shipwreck and cargo.' The
admiralty concepts of "salvage"8' and "finds,"82 together with exclusive
federal court jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases, 3 provided the
foundation for a centuries old private salvage industry. The ASA's express
72. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the primary goal of ASA as
elimination of private salvage of historic wrecks).
73. Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, 56
F.3d 556, 572 (4th Cir. 1995); See Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Unidentified,
Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 742 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D.Va. 1990); Columbus-
America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000 (1993), on remand 56 F.3d 556 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 938 (1995); sub. appL, remand, 203 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 918 (2000).
74. See generally Edward W. Horan, Organizing, Planning, and Financing a Treasure
Salvage Expedition, 30 J. MAR. L & COM. 235 (1999); Kinder, supra note 67; Sea Hunt,
Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked and Abandoned Vessel or Vessels, 47 F. Supp. 2d 678
(E.D. Va 1999) (noting over one million dollars spent locating wrecked vessels involved in
litigation).
75. Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan, 102 F. 3d 379, 382 (9th Cit. 1996)
(salvors searched for wreck for over nineteen years); California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.,
523 U.S. 491 (1998); see also LYON, supra note 67 (chronicling Mel Fisher's quest for the
Atocha).
76. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (detailing ASA restrictions on private
salvage).
77. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 569 F.2d
330, 333 (5th Cir. 1978) (son and daughter of salvor Mel Fisher plus two others killed by
accident during recovery operation); see also The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 14 (1869)
(shipwreck salvage is a "perilous... laborious and... dangerous enterprise ... ").
78. See, e.g., Columbus America Discovery Group v. Atlanta Mutual Insurance Co.,
974 F.2d 450,458 (4th Cir. 1992) (estimating overall value of cargo from the S.S. Central
America at up to one billion dollars).
79. Yukon Recovery, LLC. v. Certain Abandoned Property, 205 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th
Cir. 2000).
80. See generally THOMASJ. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTYANDMARITIMELAW, Chapter
14 pp. 834--64 (3d ed., West Hornbook Series, 2001).
81. See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (explaining maritime salvage law).
82. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (explaining maritime law of finds).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2002).
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elimination of both admiralty court jurisdiction" and substantive salvage
law"5 seriously undermines this foundation. Without the law of salvage and
finds, and a federal court armed with the power to award them, a wrecker
faces a colossal disincentive to search because of the unpredictability of the
ASA/state law rewards system.8 6 Today, once a historic wrecksite is
located, there is, in fact, a strong incentive to keep the discovery secret.8"
Under the law of salvage, a salvor's investment in wreck recovery is
compensated by a court-ordered reward from the salvaged property8 s "The
consistent policy underlying admiralty's salvage awards is that salvors will
be liberally rewarded. Admiralty holds out a continuing incentive to
undertake the physical and financial risks entailed in salvage... Marine
treasure salvors... are well-aware of this policy, and are guided by its
constancy."89 So long as a salvor makes voluntary efforts to save a vessel
in marine peril on or under navigable waters, and demonstrates some
degree of success in these efforts, a salvage award is made and enforced by
a lien' on the vessel and its cargo.9 The owner of the vessel is not a
necessary or indispensable party to the in rem action but can intervene to
recover what remains after the salvage award is paid.' The amount of a
84. 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a)(b) (2002).
85. l
86. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (describing the uncertainty created by
ASA).
87. See, e.g., Christopher L. Meazell, Being and Embeddedness: The Abandoned
Shipwreck Arts' Historical Proxy is All at Sea, 34 GA. L. REV. 1743, 1768 (2000). ("The
ASA forces would-be finders and salvors to resort to secretive measures in order to retain
... " control over discovered wrecks); Id. ("Because experienced divers and treasure hunters
will know about the requirements of the ASA, they will be discouraged from disclosing their
finds. They will work in secret to avoid governmental intervention, and will be given an
incentive to perjure themselves on the stand, as they are... often the only persons with first-
hand knowledge of the... wreck .... );" see also, LYON, supra note 68, at 22-3 "[Treasure
hunters ... are secretive, jealously guarding their knowledge of sunken ships .... One Fort
Pierce... [salvor] failed to get a salvage contract (permit) because he would never put the
location of his shipwreck into writing.").
88. See 3A NoRRis, BENEDICrON ADMIRALTY, § 16 (8th ed. 1992); Com. v. Maritime
Underwater Surveys, Inc., 531 N.E.2d 549, 551 (Mass. 1988) ("The law of salvage ... was
meant to encourage the rescue of imperiled or derelict marine property by providing a liberal
reward to those who recover property on or in navigable waters."). Id.
89. Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525
F. Supp. 186, 207 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
90. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm. Supp. Rule c(1) & c(2) (2002).
91. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 80, at 834-39; see also The Sabine, 101
U.S. 384 (1879); Jupiter Wreck Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 691 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Fla. 1988). Note also that actions may be brought in
personam against an owner who is subject to the courts' personal jurisdiction. SCHOENBAU-
M, supra note 80 at § 1-2.
92. Id.
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salvage depends on the factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in The Blackwal93 including 1) the type of danger faced by the property; 2)
the value of the saved property; 3) the risk incurred by the salvors; 4) the
salvors' skill (which some courts in treasure cases have taken to mean the
extent to which salvage was conducted with due regard to historical,
archaeological and environmental concerns)" 5) the value of the salvor's
equipment; and 6) time and labor costs in the salvage operation.95 Awards
amounting to or exceeding eighty percent of the value of a wreck and its
cargo are not unusual. 96
In the alternative, a federal court can apply the American rule of
finds ' A salvor who discovers a lost and abandoned wreck, and reduces
the wreck or some portion thereof to possession, is granted title to it
against the world. 8 Finds, a less favored remedy to that of salvage," is
normally available only when the vessel's owner is unknown or has
abandoned ownership claims."W
Procedurally, once a wreck has been found and partial recovery of
goods or artifacts has been made, the salvor will file a federal court action
requesting either an award of salvage or outright title to the wreck and its
contents. The complaint in federal court will request the issuance of a
warrant for the in rem "arrest" of the vessel and the appointment of the
salvor as its "temporary custodian." Injunctive relief is often sought to
keep competing salvors, state and federal government officials, sport divers
and others from interfering with the salvor's possession and recovery
efforts. A claim of finds is usually asserted in the alternative. 1"
The Abandoned Shipwreck Act abolishes this system of federal court
93. The Blackwall, 77 U.S.1 (1869).
94. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 80, at 842 En. 1.
95. Id. at 842.
96. See NoRRIs, supra note 88, § 240; see also Adam Lawrence, State Antiquity Laws
and Admiralty Salvage: Protecting Our Cultural Resources, 32 U. MIAMI L REV. 291,306
(1977); see also Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlanta Mutual Insurance Co., 974
F.2d 450(1992).
97. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 80, § 14-7 pp. 851-54 (detailing law of
finds in American admiralty jurisprudence).
98. Commonwealth. v. Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc., 531 N.E.2d 549, 551
(noting law of finds grants title to first party discovering and reducing to possession things
found under sea which have not been owned or are property which is long-lost or
abandoned).
99. Columbus America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 974 F.2d
450, 460 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Hemer v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)).
100. Maritime Underwater Surveys, 531 N.E.2d at 551-52.
101. See supra notes 91 and 92 and accompanying text (discussing court's jurisdiction,
in rem).
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jurisdiction and remedies for all historic abandoned shipwrecks covered by
the Act.1 2 In so doing, it creates great uncertainty for the salvor and
establishes a powerful deterrent to lawful wrecking.'0 3  This is best
understood by examining a series of difficult questions that must be
answered by the salvor under the ASA system.
The treasure hunter must first determine whether a potential wreck or
wreck site is generally covered by the ASA." If it is, it must then be
determined whether the wreck meets the technical requirements of the Act
so as to force the salvor to comply with state laws regulating shipwreck
exploration. To be covered by the ASA, the wreck must be "historic,"
"abandoned," "embedded,"(or if not embedded the wreck site must be
"eligible for inclusion in the National Historic Register") and located in the
"navigable waters" of the United States.0 5 Next, the salvor must predict
which specific state's law will control. This will be based on the salvor's
ability to pinpoint the precise location of the wreck within a state's
territorial waters."°6 Finally, the state's regulations must be interpreted and
followed, and state law must provide an express form of compensation in
order for the salvor's work to be rewarded.'0 7
Based on the best guess at answers to these questions, the salvor must
make a choice. If the ASA applies, the salvor must obtain authority to
search and recover under the controlling state's regulations and rely on the
state's system of rewards for compensation. Litigation over the applicabil-
ity of the ASA (and, therefore, the core authority of the state to regulate)
and whether its requirements are satisfied is likely."°'
102. 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a) (2002).
103. See, e.g., Yukon Recovery, LLC. v. Certain Abandoned Property, 205 F.3d 1189,
1196 (noting "[t]he ASA creates uncertainty when a salvor cannot determine in advance
whether a wreck is 'abandoned' or 'embedded' [on state lands] and therefore subject to the
ASA .... A salvor could expend immense resources to locate, survey and salvage a wreck
only to have a court later rule that the salvor is entitled to nothing .... (emphasis added);
see also statement of Rep. Norman D. Shumway (R-Cal.), H.R. REP. No. 514(11), 1001b
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 365, 370, ("the likely result (of
the ASA) will be laws which create major disincentives to private efforts to discover
shipwrecks.").
104. 43 U.S.C. § 2105; infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing Sea Hunt
litigation).
105. 43 U.S.C. § 2105.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (detailing state statutory provisions
regulating salvage).
108. See, e.g.,Zychv. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 746 F. Supp. 1334
(N.D. 111. 1990); 755 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. I11. 1991); Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. Brother
Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1398 (N.D. Ca. 1995) ("the exact location of the Brother
Jonathan [was] ... stipulated... [to be] within California's territorial sea even though it
appeared that the wreck was not more than four and one half miles off shore.").
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If the salvor concludes that the ASA does not control, a traditional
federal court salvage and finds action may be filed in federal court."°
Litigation in that court over ASA issues similar to those presented at the
state level is again likely."° If a federal court decides that a wreck is
governed by the ASA, the salvor must again look to the state and seek state
authority to search and recover. Because prior wreck identification and
exploration will have occurred without state permission, the state may
simply deny any prospective authority on procedural grounds."'
The private salvor has one final option. A salvor may conclude that
good-faith efforts to follow federal and/or state law cannot promise a fair
reward with sufficient certainty and timeliness. In that case, the salvor may
choose to work outside the law by taking the treasures of lost shipwrecks
secretly and without legal authority."2 That is, to become a modem-day
pirate. Ironically, the ASA provides a powerful incentive to following this
option.
II. THREE "MODELS" OF SHIPWRECK EXPLORATION
IN THE POST-ASA ERA
Very few professional treasure hunters (and organizations) possess the
funding, technical skills, vessels and equipment, and commitment to engage
in sophisticated historic shipwreck exploration." 3 Salvage is not, however,
limited to professionals. The ASA restricts the salvage activities of
professionals and amateurs alike. The absence of rewards and incentives
in this statute is a deterrent to all private shipwreck exploration. When
privately funded salvors stop exploration because ASA-based salvage is not
worth the investment, states are not likely to spend public monies on
government sponsored "treasure hunts"" 4 or pursue exploration with the
same skill and dedication exhibited by private salvors." Shipwreck
109. See infra notes 189-216 and accompanying text (detailing litigation in which ASA
did not apply).
110. See 43 U.S.C. § 2105; supra notes 104 and 108 and accompanying text (presenting
examples of cases moving between state and federal courts).
111. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (noting complex requirements of
applicable state statutes regulating private salvage pursuant to ASA).
112. See, e.g., supra note 87 (discussing situations in which a would-be salvor has
incentive to act outside the law).
113. See Horan, supra note 74.
114. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 184 ("The ASA gives the power of
shipwreck management to state agencies whose finances often preclude efforts to survey,
salvage, or preserve... wrecks").
115. See Giesecke, supra note 36, at 167-68 (noting drafter of the ASA provided list
of positive consequences of the Act that made no mention of state-sponsored historic
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exploration may simply stop and there will be no newly discovered historic
vessels to preserve and protect. Hundreds, if not thousands, of historically
important wrecks will remain undiscovered or be secretly salvaged.'
6
Recent shipwreck decisions illustrate the many obstacles faced by a
law-abiding salvor in the post-ASA world. These obstacles force the new-
Millennium salvor to choose whether to comply with ASA-based state
regulations, negotiate a private search and recovery arrangement with a
state, or become a pirate who salvages secretly and outside the law. This
article presents these options as three models for ASA shipwrecking: the
"Compliance" Model, "Negotiation" Model and "Pirates" Model.
A. The Compliance Model-Poor Harry Zych!
The obvious choice for the private salvor is compliance with applicable
state law from the beginning of an exploration. Thus far, the ASA has
withstood constitutional and substantive admiralty law challenges."' As
valid controlling federal legislation, the ASA treats the wrecking and
salvage business no differently than federal law treats other heavily
regulated industries. As such, salvors are legally obligated to follow state
regulations from the outset. However, as the following case studies
demonstrate, full compliance with state law is no guarantee that a law-
abiding salvor will be financially rewarded (or historically recognized) for
the discovery of an historic shipwreck.
A recent illustration of the "Compliance" explorational model is Sea
Hunt Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels."' In the late
1990's, Sea Hunt discovered what it believed to be the remains of two
Spanish military frigates, La Galga de Andalucia (LA GALGA) and the
JUNO." 9 The JUNO was lost in a hurricane in 1802" and was thought to
shipwreck discovery or salvage).
116. See McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 193 (reasoning "[L]imited budgets of most state
agencies assure that shipwrecks [will] remain undiscovered and unsalvaged").
117. See, e.g., Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 796 F. Supp.
1334-35 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (reasoning ASA does not violate "uniformity principle" of Article
III (legislative enactments on maritime and admiralty matters must "be co-extensive with and
operate uniformly in the whole of the United States"); see also Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson,
264 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1924) (declining to decide whether ASA unconstitutionally removed
federal court jurisdiction over "cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" mandated by
Article III, § 2).
118. 47 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Va. 1999); aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Sea Hunt v.
The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied
531 U.S. 1144(2001).
119. See id.
120. Id.
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be carrying a cargo of Spanish gold coins. 2' The LA GALGA and a small
fleet of merchant ships it was guarding sank in a 1750 hurricane off the
coast of the Maryland/Virginia border."22 The LA GALGA fleet was
transporting "gold and silver bullion and other valuable New World
products."'" Both vessels' remains were located within three miles of
Virginia's Assateague Island National Seashore.u They thus appeared to
Sea Hunt and Virginia to fall within the ASA and be subject to ownership
and regulation by the state."2
Sea Hunt Inc., applied to Virginia's Marine Resources Commission for
a permit"2 to begin recovery of items from the wreck sites."27 On June 10,
1997, a permit was granted providing exclusive salvage rights to these
shipwrecks within two separate six-square mile zones off the Virginia
coast."n The permit specified the search and recovery methods to be used
required documentation of artifacts and proper storage mandated the on-site
presence of a state-approved archaeologist at all times and provided
compensation to Sea Hunt of seventy-five percent of the value of all goods
salvaged with title to all historic artifacts reserved exclusively to the
state.129
In order to comply with Virginia law, Sea Hunt's application required
the review or approval of the Virginia Marine Resources Commission,
Virginia Department of Historic Resources (DHR), Virginia Institute of
Marine Science, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers."3 General supervisory authority over the
recovery process was vested in the DHR. 3 The DHR was also charged
with the responsibility of payment to permittees such as Sea Hunt, Inc., of
a "reasonable" percentage of the value of the recovery.'32
121. See Victoria Benning, Spain to Split Sunken Ships: Federal Decision Based on
Treaty, WAsiuNGToN PosT, May 3, 1999 at A6.
122. See Sea Hunt, 221 F.3d at 639.
123. See Dennis B. Blanton & Samuel G. Margolin, An Assessment of Virginia's
Underwater Cultural Resources: Virginia Department of Historic Resources Survey and
Planning Reprint Series No. 3, 23 (1994).
124. See Clarissa A. Kang, Charting Through Protectionfor Historic Shipwrecks Found
in U.S. Territorial Waters: Sea Hunt v. Unidentifie4 Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 19 VA.
ENVrL L. J. 87, 88 (2000).
125. Sea Hunt. 221 F.3d at 639.
126. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2214(B) (Michie 1998).
127. Sea Hunt, 221 F.3d at 639.
128. Kang, supra note 124, at 91.
129. Id.
130. I at 107.
131. Id at 108.
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2214 C (Michie Supp. 1999).
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Within a year of having been granted the permit, and after searching for
more than three years and expending more than one million dollars, Sea
Hunt filed a federal court in rem salvage action against the JUNO and the
LA GALGA.'33 It did so because, apparently, Sea Hunt was concerned that
claims by the Government of Spain and other salvors would jeopardize its
recovery and compensation under the Virginia permit.'" Sea Hunt sought
a declaratory judgement that Spain had abandoned the two vessels. 135
This admiralty court action was exactly the kind of litigation the ASA
was intended to remove from the federal courts.'" Sea Hunt (and Virginia
by intervention) invoked the ASA at the federal level to establish Virginia's
title to the JUNO and LA GALGA and validate Sea Hunt's exclusive
permit. 137 The government of Spain filed a verified claim to the ship-
wrecks. 38 Spain, with the support of the United States, argued that under
international law, national governments must expressly abandon sovereign
vessels and, Spain asserted, it had never done So. 139 Without abandonment,
the ASA would not apply, Sea Hunt's permit would confer no legal rights,
and Spain would be authorized to exclude all parties from the wreck sites.
At best, Sea Hunt might be eligible for a federal court salvage award." °
After three years of litigation, Sea Hunt learned the consequences of
good-faith compliance with ASA-based state regulation. On July 21, 2000,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the
1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations between the United States
and Spain'4' required express abandonment of Spain's claims to the JUNO
and LA GALGA. "2 The court determined that neither Article XX of the
1763 Definitive Treaty between France, Great Britain and Spain 43 nor the
1819 Treaty ending the War of 1812 between the United States and
133. See Sea Hunt, 221 F.3d at 639.
134. 1l
135. Id.
136. See Booth, supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting one purpose of ASA to
reduce litigation in this area).
137. See Sea Hunt, 221 F.3d at 640.
138. Jd. at 639-40.
139. Id. at 640.
140. Id. at 639 (discussing Sea Hunt admiralty complaint that sought a salvage award
as an alternative remedy to a grant of tide); see generally supra notes 88-96 and accompany-
ing text (discussing maritime law of salvage).
141. See Treaty of Friendship and General Relations, July 3, 1902, U.S. - Spain, art. X,
33 Stat. 2105.
142. Sea Hunt, 221 F.3d at 642.
143. I& at 643-46.
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Spain,'" contained such express abandonment of these vessels. 45 The
court held that "[tlhe mere passage of time since a shipwreck is not enough
to constitute abandonment."'" Without abandonment, Sea Hunt was
entitled to no legal protection from the ASA.
An additional blow to Sea Hunt's expectations was delivered in a
footnote to the Appeals Court decision. Sea Hunt's in rem complaint
asserted a salvage claim against Spain as an alternative to the ASA claim.47
"Because Sea Hunt had prior knowledge [before filing its federal court law
suit] of Spain's ownership interests and had reason to expect Spain's...
refusal to agree to salvage activity... ,"4 Sea Hunt was not entitled to a
salvage award. 149 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.5
Other cases highlight the importance of the term "abandonment"'' to
a salvor's attempts to comply with federal and state salvage law. For
example, in Fairport International Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel,
Known as the Captain Lawrence, 52 Fairport International and its president,
Steven Libert, began searching for the location of the wreck of the Captain
Lawrence in 1984. Library and archival research led Libert to conclude
that the owner of the Captain Lawrence, Wilfred H. Behrens, had
discovered a cache of gold lost in northern Lake Michigan during the Civil
War. Libert believed that Behrens' logbook and, perhaps, a chest of gold,
were on the Captain Lawrence when the ship sank on August 26, 1933,
adjacent to the shore of Lake Michigan's Poverty Island.5 3
Libert found the wreck in 1993 and confirmed that artifacts previously
discovered at the location of the wreck were from the Captain Lawrence.'-4
As in Sea Hunt, Libert applied to the state for a permit to "dredge an area
of the lake bed in which he believed the Captain Lawrence [was] embed-
ded."',5 5 Michigan denied the application. Libert then obtained a "Salvage
Bill of Sale" to the vessel from Beherens' heirs that assigned to Fairport the
144. See Sea Hunt, 47 F. Supp. at 690-91.
145. See Sea Hunt, 221 F.3d at 643 n.1.
146. Id. at 647.
147. Id. at 639; see supra note 140 and accompanying text (describing complaint seeking
salvage award as alternative to grant of title to res).
14& Sea Hunt, 221 F.3d at 647-48 n.2.
149. id.
150. Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Kingdom of Spain, 531 U.S. 1144 (2001).
151. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 164-67 (analyzing doctrine and
authorities on abandonment of shipwrecks).
152. Fairpon International Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel, Known as the
Captain Lawrence, 177 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 1999).
153. Id. at 494.
154. See id. at 494 n.2.
155. Id. at 494.
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exclusive right to salvage the Captain Lawrence.5 6 In June of 1994,
Fairport filed an admiralty complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Michigan requesting an arrest of the vessel, a declara-
tion that Fairport was its sole owner, a salvage award, and an injunction
against salvage by any other parties."' The Court granted the State of
Michigan's motion to intervene. In June of 1995, Michigan's motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was granted.' The Fairport International
Exploration, Inc., litigation was thus born. More than five years of court
battles'59 followed during which the Captain Lawrence lay unexplored and
unsalvaged, and Fairport remained uncompensated.
Fairport's initial legal difficulties were caused by the interplay between
the ASA and the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. "
The original trial court found in 1995 that Michigan had established
abandonment of the Captain Lawrence by its owner, Behrens, by a
preponderance of the evidence. 16' Abandonment under the ASA estab-
lished a "colorable claim" to the vessel by the state."2 Thus, as several
other courts had determined, a suit by a claimant such as Fairport was a suit
in the federal courts by a citizen directly against the state and was
prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.6 In 1997, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction' but that
decision was vacated by the United States Supreme Court in 1998."t In
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.,"6 the Supreme Court limited the
application of the Eleventh Amendment to cases involving ASA claims to
vessels in the state's actual "possession" 67 and required trial courts to find
abandonment by clear and convincing evidence of the type of "abandon-
ment" defined and recognized by traditional admiralty and maritime law
principles. ' s
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Fairport, 177 F.3d at 494.
159. See Fairport, 913 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Mich. 1995), aftd, 105 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir.
1997), vacated by, 523 U.S. 1091 (1998).
160. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
161. See Fairport, 913 F.Supp. at 558-59.
162. Id. at 559.
163. Id.
164. See Fairport, 105 F.3d at 1083.
165. Fairport, 523 U.S. at 1091.
166. California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
167. Id at 507-08.
168. Id. at 501-08.
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Based on this decision by the Supreme Court, Fairport was remanded
to the Sixth Circuit.1 69 In 1999, that Court remanded in turn to the District
Court with instructions to review the 1995 trial evidence for proof of
abandonment by Behrens. 7 Without a hearing and based on the original
trial record, the Court found abandonment and dismissed Fairport's
admiralty in rem action.' 7' Subsequent appeals were unsuccessful.
72
Fairport's attempts to comply with the law left it with extremely limited
options. A federal court salvage award was barred by the ASA.
173
Michigan was free to explore and salvage based on Fairport's work.
Fairport's only hope of compensation was a resort to Michigan's system for
shipwreck exploration. 74 That same system had barred Fairport's search
efforts in 199417 and would be unlikely to sanction or reward exploration
post facto.
Sunken Treasure, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned
Vessel 76 is another example of the effects of attempted ASA compliance
on a salvor's business operations. Sunken Treasure Inc. (STI) found the
"remains of a vessel from the era of Christopher Columbus"'" on the Estate
Salt River in the Virgin Islands. The submerged lands in which the vessel
was embedded were in the territorial waters of the Virgin Islands. 78 The
wreck was also located in an area designated by Congress'79 as a National
Historic Park and Ecological Preserve."W
STI sought authority from the Virgin Islands government to dredge in
the area of the Salt River in which an anchor from the vessel was believed
to be located.'" STI was told that local and federal permits would be
169. Fairport, 523 U.S. at 1091.
170. Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel, Known as the Captain
Lawrence, 177 F.3d 491, 501(6th Cir. 1999).
171. Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel, Known as the Captain
Lawrence, 72 F. Supp. 2d 795 (W.D. Mich. 1999), aff'd 245 F.3d 857 (6th Cir. 2001). cert.
denied 534 U.S. 1019 (2001).
172. Id.
173. See 43 U.S.C. § 2106 (a) (2002) (ASA removes federal court jurisdiction to award
salvage or finds).
174. Michigan had no statute relating to the management of abandoned shipwrecks
within its waters. This absence of regulation is a prime example of the uncertainty created
by the ASA.
175. See generally Fairport, 177 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 1999).
176. Sunken Treasure, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 857 F.
Supp. 1129 (D. V. I. 1994).
177. Id. at 1130.
178. Id.
179. 48 U.S.C. § 1705.
180. Sunken Treasure, 857 F. Supp. at 1130-1131.
181. Id. at 1131.
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required.' However, no formal licensing procedure existed in the Virgin
Islands.'83 STI then attempted to gain authorization through an Act of the
Virgin Island Legislature but, after many delays, it lost "patience with...
legislative channels"'"4 and prepared to "commence operations despite lack
of formal authorization."8 5 This open declaration of piracy was met by an
order from the Virgin Islands Department of Planning and Natural
Resources prohibiting STI from removing anything from the Salt River.
STI complied but filed an in rem admiralty action seeking salvage or finds
in the local federal District Court on September 18, 1991. The United
States intervened as a defendant and the Government of the Virgin Islands
entered as a plaintiff."s
On July 14, 1994, almost three years later, the District Court upheld the
Virgin Islands ASA claim of ownership to the wreck based on a finding that
the Act was constitutional.'87 Consequently, the federal admiralty court
lacked jurisdiction and was barred from awarding a salvage fee to STL
STI's case was dismissed with recourse available only in the Virgin Islands
territorial courts.' STI abandoned its public recovery efforts.
Not every ASA case leaves the private salvor empty-handed. The
litigation between Harry Zych and the State of Illinois 8 9 over the wreck of
the Lady Elgin demonstrated that a private treasure hunter could ultimately
prevail on a claim to an historic shipwreck. However, the question raised
by this case for salvors in the new Millennium is whether any treasure
hunter is prepared to spend the time (almost ten years and five federal and
state decisions)"9 and money (many tens of thousands of dollars in
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1131 n.1.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Sunken Treasure, 857 F. Supp. at 1137.
187. Id at 1137.
188. Id.
189. Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, believed to be the SB "Lady
Elgin," 746 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned
Vessel, believed to be the SB "Lady Elgin," 755 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. 111. 1990), as amended
by 1991 AMC 1261 (N.D. ill. 1991); Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel,
believed to be the SB "Lady Elgin," 960 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
985 (1992); People ex rel. Ill. Historic Preservation Agency v. Zych, 687 N.E. 2d. 141 (Il.
App. Ct. 1997); People ex re. ill. Historic Preservation Agency v. Zych, 690 N.E. 2d 1387
(111. 1998); People ex re. Ill. Historic Preservation Agency v. Zych, 710 N.E. 2d 820 (ill.
1990); (The "Lady Elgin" litigation was so protracted that the Illinois state trial judge
originally assigned to the case in 1992 retired before the litigation was completed, see infra
note 191).
190. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (detailing length and extent of Zych
litigation).
The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987
attorney's fees) required of Zych to litigate to a favorable decision on his
claim to the Lady Elgin.'9'
After searching for some sixteen years, Harry Zych found the Lady
Elgin in 1989 on the shores of Lake Michigan."9 Regarded as one of the
most notorious shipwrecks in the history of the Great Lakes, the Lady Elgin
was carrying 450 passengers from a Democratic Party rally in Chicago
towards Milwaukee, Wisconsin, when, in 1860, it collided with another
vessel and sank. 93 Shortly after the discovery, Zych filed an in rem
admiralty action in an Illinois federal court. The Illinois Historic Preserva-
tion Society (IHPA) and Illinois Department of Transportation intervened,
challenged the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, and eventually
claimed ownership of the wreck under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act. The
Lady Elgin Foundation (LEF), established in 1989 or 1990 by Zych and
CIGNA insurance (the successor-in-interest to the original insurer of the
Lady Elgin) to fund the Lady Elgin recovery project, intervened. By
agreement, CIGNA eventually transferred its interest in the wreck to LEF
in exchange for twenty percent of the gross proceeds from the sale of
property or artifacts from the wreck site."9
At the federal level, three years of court proceedings and three separate
opinions ultimately resulted in a dismissal of Zych and LEF's claims to the
Lady Elgin. District Court decisions refusing to bar the case on Eleventh
Amendment grounds and rejecting the state's ASA assertions of abandon-
ment were eventually reversed by the Seventh Circuit.'95 It held that even
the mere existence of a state claim to the Lady Elgin triggered an Eleventh
Amendment ban on federal jurisdiction."96 Zych was thus relegated to state
procedures and remedies that would add five more years of frustration to
his efforts.
In September, 1992, while Zych's original admiralty case was pending,
Illinois and the IHPA sued Zych, CIGNA and LEF in the Cook County
Circuit Court."9 Between 1992 and a bench trial decision in May, 1996,
Zych struggled to protect his interests. He first attempted to get the state
191. See generally Paul Keller, Salvor-Sovereign Relations: How the State of Illinois
Destroyed the Lady Elgin, 30 J. MAR. L & COM. 245 (1999).
192. See Zych, 746 F.Supp. at 1336.
193. Id. (noting loss of 300 passengers, most of them Democrats, caused a dramatic shift
in the balance of political power in Milwaukee from the Irish to the Germans).
194. Id. at 1337-38.
195. Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 755 F. Supp. at 216, as
amended by 1991 AMC 1261 (N.D. 111. 1991); Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and
Abandoned Vessel, believed to be the SB "Lady Elgin," 960 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1992)
(discussing elements and evidentiary standards of abandonment).
196. Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandonded Vessel, 960 F.2d at 670.
197. Keller, supra note 191, at 247.
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to comply with the preliminary injunction issued by the Illinois federal
court'98 subsequent to the Seventh Circuit decision. The injunction
prohibited any disturbance of the wreck site "other than (by) plaintiff Harry
Zych, those persons expressly authorized by him, and ... persons
authorized as agents of the State of Illinois."' 99 A state official, William L.
Wheeler, Associate Director and Counsel of the IHPA, disclosed the
LORAN numbers locating the wreck site (shared with him by Zych in
confidence) to a private diving club and designated them authorized agents
of the state.2  This immunized the club from operation of the injunction.
"Within months, all of the smaller and most valuable artifacts had
disappeared from the site." 2°1
In 1993, a consent decree was entered in the Cook County Circuit
Court under which Illinois would gain title to the wreck and all artifacts in
Zych's possession, and Zych and LEF would be credited with the discov-
ery, receive exclusive media and publication rights, and obtain all photos,
films and videos held by State agents or officials.'2 The decree was
violated by Illinois almost immediately 3 and, in 1994, the consent decree
was vacated on Zych's motion based on a finding that Illinois had not acted
in good faith.2'4
The state continued to fight Zych by applying in 1994 to have the Lady
Elgin listed on the National Register of Historic sites. 2' This would, of
course, place it within the ASA' and bolster Illinois' claim of ownership.
Based on a "misrepresentation" of the "fact" of ownership, this listing was
approved in 1995.' °
A full trial of the state's 1992 lawsuit resulted in a May 1996 unpub-
lished opinion finding that CIGNA had not abandoned the title to the wreck
it had acquired as successor-in-interest insurer.' 8 The following year the
Illinois Appeals Court reversed in a two-to-one decision that held that
ATENA had abandoned the Lady Elgin by not searching for the wreck.2'
198. See Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, believed to be the SB
"Lady Elgin," No. 89 C 6501, at 2 (N.D. Ill. filed July 22, 1992).
199. Id.
200. Keller, supra note 191, at 248-49.
201. Id at 249.
202. Keller, supra note 191, at 249.
203. Id.
204. id. at 250.
205. Id.
206. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (2002).
207. Keller, supra note 191, at 250.
208. Id.
209. People ex rel. Illinois Historic Preservation Agency v. Zych, 687 N.E.2d 141, 150
(Il. App. Ct. 1997). ("[A] 129 year period of time lapsed between the wreck... and the
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The saga of Harry Zych's twenty six year effort to claim discovery and
ownership of the Lady Elgin ended in 1999 when the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed the Appeals Court21° and reinstated the trial judge's
conclusions that: (1) CIGNA had acquired the original insurer's (AETNA)
title arising from its payment of insurance to the Lady Elgin's owner; and
(2) its failure to actively search for the wreck until Zych's discovery in
1989 did not constitute abandonment of title or ownership."' In support of
these conclusions the court noted that: (1) for over a century AETNA and
CIGNA had preserved six letters evidencing Aetna's coverage and
ownership;2 2 (2) CIGNA officials testified that other documentation "most
likely" existed but was lost in a Chicago fire;2 3 (3) although abandonment
can be expressed or inferred, failure to search is not conclusive of
abandonment when lack of technology made discovery impractical if not
impossible, search could not occur until at least the late 1970's;2"4 (4)
CIGNA asserted its rights as soon as it learned of Zych's discovery by
entering into the agreement with LEF;2 5 and (5) the trial court applied the
correct standard for abandonment which is not limited to express renuncia-
tion of ownership and considers circumstantial evidence.21 6 Accordingly,
the ASA did not apply, Illinois had no lawful claim to the Lady Elgin and
Harry Zych had finally won.
From a formalistic standpoint, compliance or noncompliance with the
ASA is not an option for today's treasure hunter. The cases in this section
emphasize, however, that compliance (obedience of the law) can force the
salvor into a world of contentious and protracted litigation at state and
federal levels. The preliminary conclusion that the ASA does or does not
apply to a specific wreck is challengeable. Even if a salvor is correct that
a particular state's law must be followed, attempted compliance with state
requirements often triggers an adversarial relationship with the state.
"[S]alvors are at the mercy of [state] government officials. When these
bureaucrats are reasonable, knowledgeable and sincere, good things can
happen. But when they have their own agendas, bad results are
discovery .... [Technological developments... made it ... easier to locate shipwrecks
in the late 1960's and early 1970's .... [The insurer] made no efforts to salvage ... for
about 20 years.").
210. People ex rel. Illinois Historic Preservation Agency v. Zych, 710 N.E.2d 820 (M.
1999).
211. l at 826.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Idt
215. Id.
216. illinois Historic Preservation Agency v. Zych 710 N.E.2d at 826; cf Columbus
America Discovery Group v. Atlantic MuL Ins. Co., 974 F.2d at 472 (4 Cir. 1992).
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inevitable. 217 Those "bad results" may ultimately be undone or amelio-
rated by the courts. However, cases like Sea Hunt, Fairport, Sunken
Treasure and, even, Zych effectively force the treasure hunter to ask
whether other options exist to formal ASA compliance. A system in which
finding gold is easier than being rewarded and recognized has inevitably
led to non-traditional alternatives to compliance. One such option is the
"Negotiation Model."
B. The Negotiation Model-David Paul Horan
The "Compliance Model" could justifiably be termed the "litigation"
model. Lengthy, costly and, at times, inconclusive lawsuits often result
from competing claims to shipwrecks covered by the ASA. The United
States Supreme Court's 1998 opinion in California v. Deep Sea Research
Inc.,2"' joined with a strategy developed by Florida admiralty attorney
David Paul Horan,"' provide an alternative model for post-Millennium
treasure hunting.
The Brother Jonathan, a 220 foot steamship, sank in 1865 when it hit
a submerged rock off the coast of Crescent Heights, California. Its cargo
included an estimated $2 million in gold and an Army payroll of $250,000,
both at 1865 values.2' For over nineteen years, Deep Sea Research (DSR)
researched and explored for the Brother Jonathan."' In 1991 DSR found
a wreck it believed to be the Jonathan and filed an in rem admiralty action
in the federal court for the Northern District of California. The State of
California intervened and asserted a claim to the wreck under the ASA.
The case was initially dismissed without prejudice on DSR's motion but
was reinstated in 1994 when DSR conclusively identified a different wreck
located four and one-half miles off the California Coast as the Brother
Jonathan.222
From the outset, the Brother Jonathan litigation was structured as an
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 223 case. DSR stipulated that the
217. Keller, supra note 191, at 245.
218. See 523 U.S. 491 (1998); see generally Forrest Booth, Who owns Sunken Treasure?
The Supreme Court, the Abandoned Shipwreck Act and the Brother Jonathan, 11 U.S.F.
MAR. L J. 77 (1999).
219. See infra notes 240-45 and accompanying text (discussing Attorney Horan's model
for treasure hunting).
220. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 495.
221. See Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d 379, 382 (9th Cir.
1996).
222. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 496.
223. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing constitutionally protected
sovereign immunity).
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wreck was "located upon submerged lands belonging to California"' even
though its location appeared to place it beyond the three mile territorial
waters limitation of the ASA.25 With this stipulation, California could
claim title under the ASA and a California Law2 vesting title in the state
of "all abandoned shipwrecks... on or in the tide and submerged lands of
California."' In so doing, the state could assert that DSR's admiralty
complaint against the Brother Jonathan was "an action against the state in
violation of the Eleventh Amendment '  and move to dismiss the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Both the California District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected California's position, held that the ASA preempted
California laws regarding title to shipwrecks, and concluded that the
Brother Jonathan was not abandoned for ASA purposes.' On review by
the United States Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor revisited and distin-
guished the Court's Eleventh Amendment plurality ruling in Florida Dept.
of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.23 that federal court in rem actions
involving state claims were barred by the Amendment only in cases of
lawful state possession of a vessel. The Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment did not prohibit an in rem admiralty action against a vessel
such as the Brother Jonathan that was not in the actual physical possession
of the state. 23' The Court declined to resolve the issues of ASA preemption
raised in the appeal. 2  The case was remanded with instructions to
reconsider the Abandoned Shipwreck Act issues without reference to the
Eleventh Amendment
233
Now facing further proceedings on the remand, DSR and California
decided that four years of litigation was enough. A settlement agreement
was entered into under which DSR was granted a salvage permit in
exchange for California's receipt of twenty percent of gold coins recovered
from the Brother Jonathan and title to all historic artifacts from the
wreck.' In essence, the state waived any ASA claims it had to the Brother
224. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 497.
225. Id at 496-98.
226. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6313 (West 1998).
227. Id
228. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 496-97.
229. Deep Sea Divers, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Col. 1995);
Deep Sea Divers, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996).
230. See 458 U.S. 670,697 (1982).
231. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 506-507.
232. Id at 508-509.
233. See id.
234. See Christopher L Meazell, Being and Embeddedness: The Abandoned Shipwreck
Act's Historical Proxy Is All at Sea, 34 GA. L REv. 1743, 1759 n.99 (2000).
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Jonathan, leaving DSR with authority to salvage. This in turn, allowed the
original 1994 in rem admiralty action" to proceed and enabled DSR to be
rewarded by the traditional maritime remedies of injunction and, most
importantly, salvage.'
Attorney David Paul Horan of Key West, Florida, is one of this
country's most prominent salvage lawyers. Attorney Horan foresaw the
problems of protracted litigation symbolized by Deep Sea Research, Sea
Hunt and Zych many years before the cases were brought. Mr. Horan
represented Mel Fisher and Treasure Salvors, Inc., through the United
States Supreme Court's decision"' in their favor, prevailed against the
State of Florida in Cobb Coin,238 and, later, went on record against the ASA
based upon federal constitutional principles. 39 Attorney Horan's experi-
ence led him to employ a "negotiation" model for ASA salvaging as early
as the 1980's.
Mr. Horan recognized that regardless of the eventual outcome of a case,
both winner and loser would spend extraordinary sums on attorney's fees
and litigation expenses. Years of recovery and preservation would be lost.
Neither the state nor the treasure hunter could be certain of the strength of
a claim to a wreck. This would be a clear deterrent to any kind of planned
or controlled exploration. He therefore adopted a negotiation strategy that
would, in essence, result in a settlement of potential competing claims prior
to the initiation of any formal litigation.'
To this day, Attorney Horan uses the Negotiation Model to free his
clients from the constraints of the ASA. "Awards of eighty percent of
salved items, with cross-sectional and unique items passed to the state,"
have been reached by contract with the state of Florida.24 Mr. Horan can
succeed in this way for several reasons. He has a reputation for profession-
alism, skill, toughness, technical expertise, tenacity, and most importantly,
success. He represents treasure hunters and investors with similar
reputations. Mr. Horan is politically sophisticated and well-connected. His
track record dates back to Mel Fisher's early 1970s discovery of the wreck
235. Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The Brother Jonathon, 883 F. Supp. at 1343.
236. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (examining maritime law of salvage).
237. Treasure Salvors, Inc, 458 U.S. 670, 700 (1982).
238. Cobb Coin Company, Inc., v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540, 561 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
239. See David Paul Horan, Historic Shipwreck Recovery, Past, Present and Future: An
Argument in Favor of Federal Admiralty Law, (Remarks at North Carolina Bar Foundation
C.LE. Seminar, Wrightsville Bench, N.C. VIII-7, April 22-23, 1988) (transcript at UNC
Law Library).
240. Interview with David Paul Horan, Esq., at the offices of Horan & Horan, Attorneys
at Law, Key West, FL (April 25, 2001). On file with author.
241. McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 197 n. 285.
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site of the 1622 Spanish galleon the Atocha 22 and the federal courts'
adoption of many of his arguments regarding the archeological, environ-
mental and legal implications of shipwreck exploration. 3
The Negotiation Model allows attorneys with standing comparable to
David Paul Horan's to approach appropriate state officials on behalf of
qualified salvors. That official may be a Cabinet member (Secretary of
State, Attorney General), legislator (Chair of the House or Senate Finance
Committee), person charged with oversight of the state's historic shipwreck
management program, or a member of the state's congressional
delegation. 2' The goal of such contact is the negotiation of a workable
arrangement between the treasure hunter's lawyer on behalf of specified
salvor(s) and the state.
The agreement can be as simple or as complex as the parties want, but
the essentials are very straightforward. The contract must authorize search
and recovery operations by the represented treasure hunter(s) for a
designated period (e.g. one to five years) and either result in the issuance
of a salvage permit or exempt the salvor(s) from applicable licensing or
permit requirements under state law. The state must expressly waive, in
advance, any potential ASA claims it might have during the contract period
and must commit to not filing ASA cases or intervening in federal
admiralty court litigation in which the contracting salvors are parties. In
exchange, the salvor(s) must share with or donate to the state a specified
percentage (normally in the twenty percent to thrity percent range) of the
actual value of items recovered from the wreck. The contract must
stipulate which items of historical significance will be claimed and/or
donated to the state. In some cases, the value of donations must be made
available as tax deductions for the donors (usually investors or financial
backers of the salvor). Other matters that may be contractually addressed
include authorized and prohibited search and recovery techniques; artifact
preservation; role(s) of state officials, if any; exclusions, in terms of
navigable areas not to be searched, existing sites, or pending claims; and
methods for accounting, reporting and verification.' 5
The benefits of the a negotiated approach are many. The state and
salvor avoid the financial burdens of protracted litigation, save the costs of
state-funded exploration, assure the quality of search and recovery
operations, guarantee that successful discoveries will generate archaeologi-
242. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
244. This strategy applies with equal force to claims made by the United States
government to sovereign vessels of the U.S. or wrecks found on federal lands.
245. See supra note 240.
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cal and historical displays by the state, and protect the public interest in
having historic items brought within state ownership. The salvor avoids the
costs and delays of state permitting, and is assured that the state will not
interfere with his projects through ASA lawsuits or other forms of
litigation.' Most importantly, the Negotiation Model restores the primary
incentive for historic ship exploration - the guaranteed financial reward
that was eliminated by the ASA.24
The Negotiation Model may prove unworkable where the state refuses
to surrender its ASA rights. This usually occurs because the negotiation
attorney lacks the standing necessary to earn the state's trust or other
political obstacles prevent negotiation.' There is, of course, no way to
monitor the frequency or success of this approach to shipwreck exploration.
For these reasons, a third and final approach is available to the modem
treasure hunter. The burdens and uncertainties of the Compliance Model,
and the practical limitations of the Negotiation Model, may force the salvor
to resort to the ancient art of piracy.
C. The Pirates Model- "I am a free prince... ,219
"Piracy. [A]n act of depredation with the intent of stealing
committed on the... seas ... [or] an act or practice of violence or
depredation that would be felonious if done ashore committed...
by one not acting under the authority of a politically organized
community.
"Depredation. [Ain act of plundering, despoiling... or pillage...
"Pirate. [O]ne who commits or practices piracy. .
Just below the surface of the court opinions, law review articles, and
personal observations regarding historic shipwreck salvage examined in
this Article, is a stark reality. Shipwreck exploration is private, secretive,
isolated and in many cases, unobservable. As a result, strong and
sometimes irresistible temptations exist to simply ignore the law when
searching for wrecks and salvaging their riches. Some. post-Millennium
explorers will succumb to these temptations and use new technologies to
246. ld
247. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing ASA's elimination of
incentives for private salvors to engage in salvage operations on historic shipwrecks in state
waters).
248. See supra note 240.
249. Clifford, supra note 67, at 25.
250. Webster's New International Dictionary 874 (3d. ed. 1986).
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engage in modem-day piracy.
The Columbia-America Discovery Group (CADG) litigation"5 over the
rights to the S.S. CENTRAL AMERICA (Central America), while not a
case of piracy, suggests why the temptation to pirate may be so great.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Columbus-America
Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,2 2 sets forth the facts
of a case of "legal brawls involving self-styled 'finders' from Ohio, British
and American insurance underwriters, an heir to the Miller Brewing
fortune, a Texas Oil millionaire, an Ivy League University, and an Order of
Catholic monks... [Tihe prize... was up to one billion dollars in gold." 3
The SS Central America was lost in a hurricane in 1857 approximately
160 miles off the coast of South Carolina.' At the time, Central America
was transporting $1,219,189 (1857 value) in gold from California to New
York.21 5 The gold was en route to New York banks to soften the effects of
the financial crisis termed the "Panic of 1857."1 Also on board were
"several hundred thousand dollars worth.. ."' (1857 value) of passenger
gold or cash coming out of the California gold rush."
Because this treasure lay on the ocean floor over 8,000 feet below the
surface, attempts at finding the site and salvaging the gold were unsuccess-
ful until CADG found the Central America in late 1988.2 9 CADG, and its
president Tommy Thompson, had discovered a wreck in 1987 and retained
Attorney David Horan' to file a non-ASA federal court in rem action
against this wreck in the Eastern District of Virginia.261 After two years of
salvage efforts, CADG realized it had been working "the wrong ship,
26 2
Salvage ceased and the search for the Central America was resumed. When
it was ultimately found, CADG reactivated the Eastern District of Virginia
case and, in 1989, persuaded the judge to issue a permanent injunction
giving CADG exclusive control of the Central America wreck site.' In
August, 1990, the same Court awarded ownership of the Central America
251. See supra note 73 (detailing procedural history of Columbus-America lawsuits).
252. Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 454.
253. Id. at 454.
254. Id. at 455.
255. Id. at 456.
256. Id at 455.
257. Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 456.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 455.
260. See supra notes 240-45 (describing a Negotiation Model for shipwreck explo-
ration).
261. Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 458.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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to CADG2 pursuant to the maritime law of "finds."O5 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court's decision that the ship and passenger
gold had been abandoned and thus belonged to CADG.2' The Court
rejected the trial judge' s conclusion that insurance companies that had paid
claims on the lost gold had abandoned their interests. Of particular legal
significance were the facts that (1) technology to search for this wreck was
not available until the late 1970's, (2) the insurance underwriters never
purposely destroyed or abandoned original insurance contracts or docu-
ments, 7 and (3) as soon as the technology became available these
companies worked with numerous salvors (including the award of some
salvage contracts) in efforts to find the Central America.' The Court
remanded for various further proceedings and mandated application of the
law of salvage to determine a "proper salvage award"' for CADG's
discovery of the insurance companies' gold. It was observed that
"Columbus-America should ... receive by far the largest share of the
Treasure. 27' The Court suggested "an award in specie" defined as "a
percentage of the total recovery, rather than... a set monetary amount"
because "salvaging efforts have not been completed. '27 ' At the time of this
decision, CADG had recovered "several hundred million dollars worth
(present value) of gold coins, ingots, and bars."272 from the Central
America. The overall value of the cargo was still estimated to be "up to
one billion dollars."'' leaving vast amounts of gold to be brought up.
The CADG litigation traveled through the federal courts system for a
decade. Ultimately, CADG was awarded a salvage fee equal to ninety
percent of the value of the gold, recovered and unrecovered.274 A
complicated (and confidential) marketing program for the phased sale of
the gold was put in place.275 The United States Supreme Court denied
264. ld. at 459.
265. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (explaining maritime law of finds).
266. Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 468.
267. Id. at 466.
268. 1d. at 466-67 ("[In at least one instance all the documents in an insurer's file on
the CENTRAL AMERICA were stolen by a would-be salvor). Id.
269. l1& at 468.
270. Id.
271. Id. at469.
272. Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 468.
273. Id.
274. Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 203 F.3d
291, 296, 303 (4th Cir. 2000).
275. Id. at 296, 303.
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certiorari three times before this process ended.276 Three judges died
during the litigation.2"
A settlement finally terminated this case. In it, the insurance underwrit-
ers relinquished their claims to ten percent of the total cargo of gold by
taking an in specie ten percent share of the recovered items.278 As against
the insurance companies, CADG became the sole owner of future treasure
salvaged from the Central. 79 CADG received a ninety percent share of
recovered items in specie.' The District Court retained jurisdiction over
CADG's in rem case."
Tommy Thompson and CADG had prevailed. But, they had done so
only "after much effort and expense." 2 CADG started its quest to find the
Central America in the early to mid-1980's. Vast sums of money were
spent. CADG broke new ground using sophisticated technologies 3 to find
an historic shipwreck in deep ocean water. CADG was willing to bear the
costs of lengthy litigation and endure extended delays in being rewarded for
its work.
The CADG experience inevitably raises this question for the future: if
the modern-day salvor can find and recover treasure on wreck sites like the
Central America, or the JUNO and LA GALGA, without anyone else's
knowledge, is compliance with the law, literally or through negotiation, in
order to salvage that treasure really worth it?
The Pirates Model's answer is "no"! There has always been a segment
of the treasure hunting fraternity that has operated on the edge of the law.
The ASA was enacted partially in response to this.' When the stakes are
as high as they are in cases like Columbus-American or Sea Hunt, and the
law as convoluted as it is in both ASA and traditional admiralty cases, a
276. See Columbus America, 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992); Columbus America
Discovery Group, 56 F.3d at 576; (showing tortured procedural history of Columbus-
America); Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned
Salvaging Vessel, 742 F.Supp 1327 (E.D. Va. 1990).
277. Columbus-America Discovery Group, 203 F.3d at 296.
278. See, e.g., id. at 301.
279. d at 302.
280. Id. at 296-97.
281. d. at 301.
282. Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 458.
283. Columbus-America, 742 F. Supp. at 1330 ("A specially equipped ship was obtained
.... Among the equipment was a side-scan sonar, satellite navigation, tele-operated deep-
sea equipment submersible with stereo camera and robotic arms and computer modeling
software.").
284. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text (discussing ASA as statutory
response to perceived unlawful behavior by private salvors).
2003]
198 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:167
certain small number of treasure explorers will choose to become modem
day pirates.
No legitimate salvor will openly acknowledge pirate activity.
However, circumstantial, anecdotal and off-the-record evidence exists to
substantiate the existence of unauthorized search and salvage operations
now and to predict increased private activity in the near future. 5 A
recognized world-wide "black market" exists for trading in historic
shipwreck items of all kinds. 6 A few treasure hunters have acquired
reputations for conducting unsanctioned salvage; some are already banned
from shipwreck exploration in certain countries. 7 Others talk openly, if
privately, of planned pirate expeditions. 8 And, most importantly, new
technologies and equipment exist to make it practically feasible to "go the
pirate's way."
The emergence of new Millennium pirates is greatly facilitated by the
availability of private submarines. Several submarine manufacturers now
offer high-tech vessels that are ideal for secret and unauthorized shipwreck
exploration.
At the lower end, Nautilus Underwater Systems of Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida, sells a twenty-four foot, five-man electric submarine that is yacht-
based. This million dollar vessel will descend to 525 feet for up to ten
hours. At the top end, for $78 million, U. S. Submarine of Shelton,
Washington, will build a 213-foot vessel, the Phoenix 1000, that has 5,000
square feet of interior space, portholes up to seven feet, and, for the
wrecker, a fully operational docking mini-sub. The most flexible boat may
be the $15 million Olympic 105 built by Olympic Submarine Technologies,
also of Shelton, Washington. This 105-foot sub accommodates up to ten
people for ten days and can be outfitted with a diver lockout chamber.2 9
When combined with more traditional search and salvage methods2' these
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private submarines29' will encourage some salvors to resort to clandestine
exploration and recovery.'
The Pirates Model is an ironic consequence of the elaborate formalistic
system of historic shipwreck exploration and preservation established by
the ASA. "The Law" has always fostered "the Outlaw." The question is,
however, whether any reform short of outright repeal of the ASA, and a
return to the pre-ASA system of federal court admiralty jurisdiction over
finds and salvage cases, will prevent high-tech piracy.293
IV. REFORMS: MANDATED OR GUARANTEED REWARDS
Mel Fisher once observed that abandoned shipwrecks "have no social
or cultural value as long as they remain in the seabed. They are simply
abandoned."'  He could also have added that such wrecks lack monetary
or historic value until they are located and salvaged.
Critics of the ASA have pointed out that the Act provides very little or
no incentive for states to conduct their own search and recovery efforts and
provides powerful disincentives for private salvage of historic ship-
wrecks.29 Both have been examined in this Article. Accordingly, any
reform of the ASA must focus on guaranteeing an appropriate reward for
private discovery of historic shipwrecks and recovery of items therefrom
by methods sensitive to archeological and environmental concerns. This
approach offers two immediate benefits. First, it restores the positive
incentive to private treasure hunting lost by the Act's removal of federal
court salvage and finds jurisdiction. Second, it may discourage the kinds
of illegal, covert and unauthorized treasure hunting referred to in the Pirates
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Model section of this article.
Under current law, states are not required to offer rewards for
successful shipwreck discovery or salvage.' There is significant lack of
uniformity in state shipwreck permitting and management programs.2"
Bureaucratic, political and, even, psychological obstacles can prevent
compliance with state law or a negotiated reward.2 Therefore, the law
regulating historic shipwreck exploration would be significantly strength-
ened by Congressional amendment of the ASA to provide any of the
following reforms.
A. Require the ASA Guidelines to Recognize the Importance
of Guaranteed Rewards as Incentives
to Responsible Historic Shipwreck Exploration
Current ASA guidelines issued by the National Park Service in 1990
are openly hostile to the private salvor. The guidelines recommend that
states: "protect ... state-owned shipwrecks from commercial salvage,
treasure hunting and private collecting activities" 9 by, basically, prohibit-
ing such work. ° In this spirit, the guidelines impose no requirement that
states offer specified financial rewards for either discoveries made pursuant
to state permits or brought to the states attention by conscientious treasure
hunters who are aware of the ASA's vesting of ownership in the states.
Congress could amend sections 2104(a) and (b)9° of the ASA to require a
new guideline issued by the Park Service providing that state management
plans should "(5) provide state-guaranteed financial rewards for historic
shipwreck discoveries reported to the state or identified, salved or explored
pursuant to state authority."
Issuance of such a guideline would impose no enforceable obligation
on the state to put reward/incentive programs in place. The guidelines are
advisory and non-binding.3°' However, the addition of the proposed
guideline (5) would at least highlight the problems caused by the absence
of state rewards and, perhaps, force the states to examine existing reward
programs, if any.
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B. Make the Guidelines Mandatory
In addition to specifying a requirement of state rewards, Congress
could amend section 2104(a) of the ASA to provide that "such guidelines
shall be binding on the states and appropriate federal agencies in develop-
ing legislation and regulations to carry out their responsibilities under...
the Act.
C. Condition Receipt of Federal Funds on Adoption
of State Reward Programs
The optional character of the guidelines is the result of National Park
Service commentary in the Introduction section to the guidelines indicating
that the drafters rejected compulsory standards. 3 Congress could amend
sections 2104(a) and (b) to make state adoption of the guidelines (as
modified above) a prerequisite for federal funding of state historic
preservation programs authorized by the National Historic Preservation
Act' and supported by Historic Preservation Fund grant awards. Although
this approach would not compel state adoption of salvage reward programs,
for the first time states would have concrete incentives to do so. °5 This
approach could also be implemented by conditioning receipt of federal
funds under any marine or environmentally-related federal legislation on
state adoption of reward systems.
D. Fund State Rewards by Direct Congressional Appropriation
Congress could require the Department of the Interior to include in its
annual budget a request for appropriation of funds for a program of state
financial incentives. Grants based on state proposals or direct distributions
to each state adopting a guaranteed reward program could be made based
on a formula weighted to reflect the level of wrecking activity in each state
over a period of time as recorded by the state.
Regardless of the financial incentives mechanism employed, the goal
of legislative reform3° must be to encourage careful private historic
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shipwreck exploration while preserving state and public interests and
minimizing the temptations to search and salvage outside the law.
A particular advantage of formalized rewards programs is the
opportunity to regulate the exploration process by limiting and controlling
rewarded activity. Judicial standards for making state financial awards
routinely include matters not covered by the original Blackwall factors'
traditionally considered by admiralty courts in salvage cases. For example,
the court in Columbus-America added to Blackwall consideration of "the
degree to which the salvors have worked to protect the historical and
archeological value of the wreck and the items salved."' One author has
suggested awards limited to "disclosure of information pertaining to a
shipwreck-such as its location, a detailed descriptions or reports of
vandalism."'  It was noted that "a standard policy to reward 'honest and
expeditious reporting of pertinent information . . .' would reduce the
inclination for a finder ... to pilfer the site.. ."'30 of an historic wreck.
Reward programs would allow each state to implement broad shipwrecking
goals and policies through the amount and availability of awards for
specified exploration activities.
One final benefit would flow from reforms of this kind. At present, a
treasure hunter's chances for financial gain from historic shipwreck
discovery depend on the fortuity of location. If a wreck is found within the
three (or nine) mile limit of state territorial waters the ASA applies, the
state has title, and the wrecker's reward (if any) is controlled by state
law."' A discovery outside these waters triggers application of the
maritime law of salvage and finds and offers a far more predictable
reward.3 2 Amending the ASA and the guidelines to more strongly
encourage or mandate state reward programs will eliminate the existing
inconsistency in rights based solely on the accident of geography. A
treasure hunter who knows that successful exploration will be properly
rewarded by government is less likely to choose the pirates way.
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V. CONCLUSION
The SECOND NEWPORT SYMPOSIUM on "Sunken Treasure: Law,
Technology, and Ethics" identified "a number of commendable accomplish-
ments" of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987. 3'3 It was noted that, as
a result of the ASA, "most states would not allow ... [private] salvor
activity .... Even in Florida, where salvor activity has a long history, few
wrecks have been released to salvors since the passage of the ASA."3"4
This Article has examined the operation of the ASA through three
models of treasure hunting: the Compliance, Negotiation and Pirates
Models. Each model suggests that legislative destruction of the private
salvage industry is not the positive achievement some commentators
believe it to be. The Article calls for Congressional recognition of the fact
that post-Millennium treasure hunters armed with high-tech equipment
have the capacity to explore and salvage outside the law. The time has
come to reexamine the ASA to determine whether creation of a new breed
of modem day pirates is a tolerable consequence of the Act. This Article
offers reasons to those concerned about the treasures of the sea supporting
the conclusion that it is not.
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